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BARRIERS TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
HAGUE CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND COOPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
CaeliElizabeth Kimball*
INTRODUCTION

The recent tsunami disaster that devastated many regions in Southeast Asia on
December 27, 2004, has brought an unprecedented outpouring of humanitarian aid
from around the world.' Some of the most heart-rending images beamed into
American homes have been pictures of frightened children temporarily or
permanently separated from their parents, many of whom were killed. In response
to the disaster, Americans have flooded the U.S. Department of State with phone
calls and letters voicing interest in adopting Tsunami orphans.2
American families' strong interest in international adoption is by no means a
new phenomenon. For the last fifty years, economic, social, and political changes
in foreign countries have led hundreds of thousands of American families to adopt
foreign children for altruistic and personal reasons. After World War II, families
from the United States rushed to adopt orphans from Germany, Italy, and Greece.
Similarly, both the Korean and Vietnam wars prompted huge movements by
American families to adopt Korean and Vietnamese children.4 Only thirty
Romanian children were internationally adopted in 1989, but the economic and
social policy shifts of the Cold War allowed for over 10,000 intercountry adoptions
to take place following Nicolae Ceausescu's fall in 1991. 5 China, Russia, and
Korea are examples of sending countries reluctant to allow their orphans to be
internationally adopted, but Russia is currently "the world's largest supplier of
orphans" to U.S. families, with China as a close second.6
Despite the overwhelming number of American families yearning to adopt
tsunami orphans, the Department of State must look to the principles behind the

* Juris Doctor, 2005, University of Denver College of Law; Bachelors Degree, 2002, Smith College.
The author would like to extend a special thanks to her parents for their immense love and support.
1. See eg., Jonathan Padget, Danish Dancing: Morten Misson and Camera Take a Turn Around
the Ballroom, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at C05; CharityBreakfast Aids Asian Tsunami Children, INS.
DAY, Jan. 14, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ins. Day File.
2. Chris Echegaray, Tsunami Orphans' Adoption Restricted, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 7, 2005,
availableat LEXIS. News Library, Tampa Trib. File.
3. Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Foreign Aff. File.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Linda J. Olsen, Live or Let Die: Could Intercountry Adoption Make the
Difference? 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 483,499-500 (2004).
6. Kapstein, supra note 3.
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U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (JAA) 7 and to international adoption laws
that promote legal adoptions and protect interests of children worldwide.8 In doing
so, the Department of State announced its decision to disallow the adoption of
tsunami children by American families for three reasons: (1) the United States
received reports of child trafficking for illegal adoption of Tsunami children; (2)
the current inability of the countries of origin to determine whether children are
legally orphaned; 9 and (3) the strong likelihood that children are experiencing
substantial trauma from the natural disaster, which would potentially increase the
emotional impact of moving to a foreign country for adoption into a new family. 10
These considerations make a strong cause for caution; intercountry adoption may
not be within the best interests of tsunami children at this time."
These recent events triggered a discussion over international adoption that
should bring renewed attention to the status of the Hague Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague
Convention). 12 For over a decade, the Hague Convention has been the driving
force for nations to establish governing regulations over a process that leads to a
definitive event in the lives of adopted children and their adoptive families.
Although these efforts have achieved a measure of success to date, 13 significant
political and cultural obstacles must be overcome before an international consensus
regulating intercountry adoptions can truly be put in place. Those barriers, as
shown in this paper, may be insurmountable.
Since its popularization in the 1950s, intercountry adoption has been subject
to a mesh of conflicting adoption laws and red tape in both sending and receiving
countries. 14 It was not until horrific stories of child trafficking and child abduction
were unearthed and reported in international media that international organizations
saw the drastic need to establish uniformity in intercountry adoption regulations
and procedures. 15 In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention on the
7. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit. 1(2d.
Sess. 2000).
8. See Echegaray, supra note 2 [hereinafter IAA]
9. To be deemed an orphan, the country of origin must conclude that the parents of the child are
deceased, or that the child has been legally abandoned in order to legally terminate parental rights.
10. Echegaray, supra note 2; Jean Hopfensperger, Disaster in Asia: Foreign Adoptions: Children
of Tsunami Victims Aren 't Adoption Candidates, STAR TRIB., Jan. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS, News

Library, Star Trib. File. "Country of origin" means the country from which the orphaned child being
adopted is domiciled.
11. Hopfensperger, supra note 10.
12. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, [herein
the "Hague Convention"], 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1135, 1139, (1993).
13. See eg., AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK [herein
"IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK"], Ch. 14, Intro. (2004).

14. Susann M. Bisignaro, Comment: Intercountry Adoption Today and the Implications of the
1993 Hague Convention of Tomorrow, 13 DICK. .. INT'L L. 124, 126-31 (1994). Sending countries are
countries that put their children up for international adoption. Sending countries is synonymous for
"country of origin." Receiving countries are countries where the prospective adoptive parents reside,
which will be the child's country of citizenship once the adoption has been finalized.
15. Kapstein, supra note 3.
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Rights of the Child (CRC), to recognize children's human rights. 16 The CRC laid
the foundation for the Hague Convention, enacted in 1993, which established
regulations and procedures to protect the interests of the children being adopted
and sought to potentially unify international adoption laws. 17 The goals and values
underlying the Hague Convention have been received with great support, with
sixty-four countries ratifying or acceding to the Hague Convention as of August
2004.18 However, the United States, one of the largest receiving countries, and
China and Korea, historically two of the largest sending countries, have yet to
become parties.' 9
Although Congress adopted the IAA in 2000, it had not been put into effect as
of January 2005. Until that occurs, the United States cannot become a party to the
Hague Convention. The concerns delaying the United States' implementation of
the Hague Convention are primarily rooted in financial and business concerns,
rather than cultural and moral perspectives. Not only do sending countries
potentially face these same issues, but many of the primary sending countries also
face the more serious problem of societal and cultural objections to international
adoption of their children. Even if sending countries permit adoptions to take
place, it is unlikely that these sending countries will endorse an international
agreement that imposes procedures that must be followed in order to participate in
international adoptions with member countries.
The Hague Convention fails to address several conceptual and practical issues
that are critical to achieving its goals. Despite good intentions to protect the
interests of children being adopted, and to establish systems for ensuring legal
adoptions, the Hague Convention favors compliance of receiving countries, which
tend to be wealthier and more able to bear the economic burdens posed by
compliance than comparatively poor sending countries. The treaty depends on the
cooperation between the receiving and sending countries, and three of the largest
sending countries-Russia, China, and Korea-have yet to ratify the Hague
Convention over a decade after signing the treaty. 20 Although the Hague
Convention sets forth specific requirements for its members regarding intercountry
adoption procedures, nowhere does the treaty prohibit members from engaging in
intercountry adoptions with non-members. Signatories of the Hague Convention

16. Convention on the Rights of the Child (herein the "CRC"), G.A.Res. 44, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25/20 (1989).
17. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 1.L.M. at 1139.
18. IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13.
19. In this paper, "member states" and "parties" are used interchangeably to label those countries
that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention. Countries who ratify the Hague Convention are
referred to as members, parties, or Hague countries. The Hague Convention is referred to by name, or
by "the treaty," as all compacts between nations are described as 'conventions' or as 'treaties,' since
there is no substantial distinction in the terms. See generally 74 AM.JUR.2D TREATIES §2 (2005).
20. This paper recognizes that Russia is the largest sending country at this moment in time;
however, this paper will only focus on China and Korea to examine the impact of the cultural issues in
combination with the economic burdens of implementation that influence these sending countries'
decision to ratify the Hague Convention. Russia does not possess the same long history of participation
in intercountry adoption, nor the history of cultural opposition to the practice like China and Korea.
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agree to the purpose and goals behind the treaty but the treaty dos not require every
signer to ratify or accede to it.
The undue economic burden of compliance, in conjunction with underlying
social and cultural opposition to intercountry adoption, provides little incentive for
ratification by major sending countries, such as China and Korea, who have
actively participated in intercountry adoption for over half a century. In all
likelihood, intercountry adoptions between parties and non-parties to the Hague
Convention will continue even if major sending countries choose not to ratify the
treaty, undermining the goals and purpose of the Hague Convention.
Part I of this paper looks at some of the reasons that sending countries such as
China and Korea depend on intercountry adoption to care for their orphans. From
the sudden trend of allowing international adoptions came corrupt adoption
practices and child trafficking stories that cried for international adoption
regulations. Part II explores the regulations set forth by the Hague Convention and
the influences of early international legislation, attempting to establish regulations
for intercountry adoptions. In addition, this paper addresses issues that were not,
but should have been addressed by the Hague Convention. Part III examines the
steps the United States has taken to ratify the Hague Convention, and the
controversies that have slowed down the process. Part IV looks at the social and
cultural opposition, in conjunction with the economic burdens of compliance on
sending countries that exceeds the burden on receiving countries that make the
major sending countries reluctant and slow to ratify the Hague Convention. This
paper concludes that, although the Hague Convention promotes and regulates the
practice of intercountry adoption, in an effort to protect both the children being
adopted and abolish corrupt practices, the treaty neglects to recognize economic
and cultural issues that impose barriers to some of the major sending countries. By
failing to recognize these major hurdles, the Hague Convention fails to provide
sufficient incentives for major sending countries to become parties to the treaty.
Accordingly, the Hague Convention may not achieve the goals of cooperation
between sending and receiving countries and the unification of international
adoption laws.
I. THE INTEREST AND NEED FOR INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS BEG FOR REGULATION
OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION PRACTICES

A. Interest in IntercountryAdoptions is at an All-Time High
The number of intercountry adoptions has progressively increased over the
last fifty years as sending countries looked internationally for solutions when they
encountered a domestic shortage in available homes for their orphans and
unwanted children. While the concept was virtually unheard of in the United
States prior to World War 11,21 a total of 18,447 foreign-born children were
adopted by U.S. families in the year 2000.22 In 2001, over 34,000 intercountry
21. Olsen, supra note 5, at 496-97 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (1986)).
22. Intercountry Adoption, National Adoption Information Clearinghouse 2001, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f inter/finter.cfm (last visited
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adoptions took place worldwide, with the United States receiving over 19,000
adoptees.23 20,000 foreign born children were adopted in 2003 alone.24 Interest in
intercountry adoption is escalating at such a rapid pace that families willingly foot
international adoption fees anywhere from $12,000 to $30,000 and wait one to
three years for the entire adoption process to be completed.25 The greatest number
of internationally adopted children come from China, Russia, South Korea,
Guatemala, Romania, Vietnam, Ukraine, India, and Cambodia.26 In general, these
countries resort to international adoption as a means of providing for some of their
children when they are faced with economic, social, and political changes or
problems.
B. Overpopulation and Domestic Family Policies Lead Countries to Allow
Their Orphans and Unwanted Children to be internationallyadopted
China and Korea have been two of the primary sending countries for over half
a century. Cultural gender attitudes, overpopulation, and in China's case, domestic
family law policies, lead Asian families to abandon their children, creating a large
number of orphans and unwanted children in need of adoptive homes.27 In Asian
culture, it is atypical to have non-relative adoption, which in part is the reason why
Asian families reject adopting children from overseas.28 The stigma associated
with adopting a non-relative makes it difficult to find willing adoptive parents in
the country of origin. Due to the nonexistence of domestic adoptions and the
increasing number of children overcrowding orphanages, China and Korea turned
to foreign countries for placement of their orphaned children in homes overseas.
1. China
Deeply engrained in the minds of China's people is the belief that sons should
be valued more highly than daughters, leading many Chinese women to abandon
their newborn girls.29 Statistics show that 95 percent of China's orphanages are
filled with females. 30 An estimated 150,000 baby girls are abandoned yearly,
though the Chinese government can hardly guess the number of babies
unknowingly drowned.3'
In conjunction with the dominant value placed on sons, Chinese family law
policies account for the increasing need for Chinese orphans to be internationally
Jan. 3, 2005) [hereinafter NAIC].
23. Kapstein, supra note 3.
24. Ann M. Simmons, U.S. Proposalson Adoptions Abroad get Mixed Reviews, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, at A24.
25. NAIC, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. See generally, Jessica L. Singer, Intercountry Adoption Laws: How can China 's One-Child
Policy Coincide with the 1993 Hague Convention on Adoption, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 283
(1998).
28. Id. at 296.
29. See Ivan Png, Change of Chinese Heart on Adoption, STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Nov. 8,
2004, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Straits Times File.
30. Id.
31. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALSTEIN, ADOPTION ACROSS BORDERS: SERVING THE CHILDREN

IN TRANSRACIAL AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS 11 (2000).
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adopted. To control the serious overpopulation problem plaguing China, the
Chinese government implemented a one-child policy in 1979.32 Under this policy,
parents wanting to give birth to more than one child must obtain permission from
their regional government years prior to actual conception. 33 Violations of the onechild policy range from wage cuts to refusal of government benefits, such as food
rations and free education.34 By prohibiting families from having more than one
child, the government places Chinese families under extreme pressure to conceive
a son who can carry on the family name and provide support to his parents in their
old age.35 The government and cultural pressures contribute greatly to the number
of abandoned female newborns simply because they were the first-born children
and were not male.
2. Korea
Like China, Korea has become one of the largest sending countries in the
world for international adoption. The Korean government began allowing its
children to be placed through intercountry adoptions in 1954 and since then
between 150,000 and 200,000 South Korean children have been adopted
internationally. 36 The 1954 action resulted from the large number of Korean
37
Many of
children fathered by American servicemen during the Korean War.
these children were orphaned by the war or abandoned because of their mixed
heritage 38 and rather than deal with them domestically, the Korean government
allowed a large number of them to be internationally adopted. As of 2004, 7,000
Korean children are abandoned each year, and approximately 2,000 of those
children are adopted overseas. 39 For countries such as Korea and China who either
cannot, or are reluctant to care for their orphans, intercountry adoption poses a
good solution for overcrowded orphanages and allows countries to provide orphans
good homes. However, the increase of intercountry adoptions was accompanied
by corruption and wrongdoing, which set the stage for an important effort to
regulate intercountry adoption through international agreements.

32. Id. at 9; Singer, supranote 27, at 290-91. China's population grew from almost 700 million to
just under 1000 million people from the early 1960s to 1979, when the one-child policy was enacted.
at
Country,
Whole
the
of
Data
Demographical
Historical
China:
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Asia/chinac.htm (last visited March 21, 2005). Since the
policy was enacted in 1979, China's population has only increased by approximately 100 million people
in ten years. Id.
33. Singer, supra note 27, at 291.
34. Id. at 292.
35. Id. at 294.
36. Khang Hyun-sung, Sweet Intent, Bitter Legacy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library, S. China Morning Post File.
37. Id.
38. It can be implied that children of mixed heritage have mixed bloodlines, tainting the purity of
treasured Korean bloodlines. See generally SIMON & ALSTEIN, supranote 31, at 7.
39. A Beautiful Wedding, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 13, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Korea Herald File.
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C. Corrupt Adoption Practices, Child Trafficking and Red Tape Created
Urgencyfor Uniformity of IntercountryAdoption Regulations and Procedures
Allowing children to be internationally adopted provides a service to both
sending and receiving countries. Sending countries can decrease overpopulation
and "get rid of' unwanted children, which in turn allows parents in receiving
countries to adopt a new member into their family when they are unable to have
their own children, or are moved to adopt a child in need. Unfortunately, the many
positive benefits of intercountry adoption opens the door to persons who willingly
facilitate adoptions solely in the interest of turning a profit. One major news story
that exposed corruption in the intercountry adoption process documented how
senior officials in Honduras aided in kidnapping children from poverty-stricken
families and sold them to interested foreigners in the early 1990s. 4 0 A U.N. report,
issued in 2000, revealed that Guatemala was the leading supplier of infants
worldwide, Guatemalans were involved in the "buying and selling of children, the
falsification of documents, the kidnapping of children, and the housing of (these)
Yet another instance of child trafficking
babies awaiting private adoption. '
surfaced, revealing that Romanian nuns coerced single mothers to give up all rights
to their children, allowing the nuns to make up to $15,000 profit per child.42 Over
the years, these stories of corruption tarnished the reputation of intercountry
adoption as a whole, making receiving countries skeptical about "doing business"
with sending countries for fear that they might inadvertently promote corrupt
adoption proceedings.43
The lack of uniformity among national procedures and laws regarding
intercountry adoption not only encouraged corruption, but created red tape for
parents interested in intercountry adoption. 44 For example, many Asian countries
preferred that all adoption proceedings be handled by U.S.-based adoption
agencies; contrastingly, countries in Central and South America preferred direct
adoptions, requiring the adoptive parents to directly contact orphanages and child
services in the foreign country.45 Along with the lack of procedural uniformity
came a lack of monitoring and enforcement of adoption procedures, allowing
governments in the sending countries to demand more "gifts" in return for
relinquishing a child.46
Faced with the reports of corrupt adoption procedures and child trafficking,
many receiving countries condemned countries known for their corrupt adoption

40. Kapstein, supra note 3.
41. Id.
42. Amy Grillo Kales, The IntercountryAdoption Act of 2000: Are its Laudable Goals Worth its
Potential Impact on Small Adoption Agencies, Independent Intercountry Adoptions, and Ethical
Independent Adoption Professionals?36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 477, 484 (2004).
43. Sending countries known for selling their children have tarnished reputations, as it shows that
the countries are not following regulations to promote lawful adoptions. See generally Kapstein, supra
note 3.
44. Bisignaro, supranote 14, at 125.
45. Id. at 125-26.
46. Id. at 126.
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practices, refusing to "do business" with them.47 A struggle emerged, as countries
could not condone the corrupt behavior of some sending countries, 48 yet so many
benefits came from the practice of intercountry adoption. There was an imminent
need for regulation of intercountry adoptions and protection of children's rights.
Individual countries, as well as international bodies of law decided that it was time
to take action and create some uniformity in adoption laws to prevent child
trafficking and safeguard proper adoption procedures.
II.

THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY OF PROCEDURES TO

GOVERN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS

A. Convention on the Rights of the Child
From the many instances of child trafficking that began soon after the
popularization of intercountry adoption, the United Nations made a formal push to
recognize the human rights of children by adopting the CRC on November 20,
1989.49 The CRC is rooted in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of
1924, the first international declaration to recognize that children are entitled to
special care and protection.5 ° The CRC defines a child as "every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier." 5' All parties to the CRC are responsible for protecting
children against all forms of discrimination and punishment.52 Two monumental
points of the CRC are the requirement that all action be taken in "the best interest
of the child,, 53 and that parties will protect against child trafficking by
"combat[ing] the illicit transfer and non-return of the children abroad. 54 These
principles carried over into the Hague Convention.
B. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of IntercountryAdoption
Protecting the interests of the child and combating child trafficking were
important first steps made by the CRC, but regulation and monitoring of
intercountry adoptions were essential pieces missing from that treaty. Uniformity
of regulations and systematic oversight of intercountry adoption proceedings
represented key components to achieving the premises set forth in the CRC.
On May 29, 1993, the Hague Convention was completed, thereby introducing
measures to govern international adoptions.55 Signing the Hague Convention
47. Echegaray, supra note 2.
48. Countries infamous for their corrupt practices are Honduras, Guatemala, and other Central
American countries. See Kapstein, supra note 3.
49. CRC, supra note 16. The Commission on Human Rights drafted the CRC. Id. Human rights
of a child not only include humanitarian rights, but civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
Id.
50. Id. at Preamb. The Declaration was drafted by Save the Children International Union, and
adopted by the League of Nations in 1924.
51. Id. at art.1.
52. Id. at art.2(2).
53. Id. at art.3(l).
54. Id. at art.1(1).
55. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1134-36, Introductory Note.
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indicates an intention to eventually become a party to the treaty; 56 however,
countries who sign the treaty are under no obligation to ratify it. 57 The Hague
Convention only legally binds those countries who ratify the treaty to become
members.58 Therefore, countries may choose to accede to the Hague Convention,
instead of ratifying 59it, affirming their commitment to the policy without becoming
bound by its terms.

As of August 1, 2004, sixty-four countries have become parties to the Hague
Convention. 60 To be successful, the Hague Convention needs the participation of
both the sending and receiving nations. 61 The four primary goals of the Hague
Convention are:
(1) to ensure that the international adoption is in the child's best interest;
(2) to create a cooperative system amongst participating nations, in efforts to
curtail child trafficking and prevent other abuses;
(3) to ensure that intercountry adoptions that conform to the Hague Convention's
requirements are recognized; and
62
(4) to ensure proper consent to the adoption.
To accomplish these goals, the Hague Convention poses three generalized
categories of compliance: (1) investigation of the child and the parents to ensure
that the adoption is in the child's best interests; 63 (2) creation of a central authority
in each member state to establish domestic adoption regulations and to oversee all
56. Meghan Hendy, Hague Convention: Next Steps for the United States, Bulletin of the Joint
available at
2004),
(Winter
Services,
on
International Children 's
Council
www.jcics.org/HagueNextSteps.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
57. Id.
58. Notesong Srisopark Thompson, Note: Hague is Enough?: A Call for More Protective,
Uniform Law GuidingInternationalAdoptions, 22 WIS. INT'L L. J. 441,457 (2004).
59. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1144, Ch.VII, art. 44; Thompson, supra note
58, at 459.
60. Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, Status Table, Member States of the Organisation [herein "Status Table of
http://hcch.eat
available
Convention"]
Hague
with
States
Contracting
vision.nl/index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); see also
IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13. The sixty-four countries party to the Hague
Convention are: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea,
Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Id.
61. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1134-38, Context Summary.
62. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1139, Ch.l, art.I; see also U.S. Department of
Justice, Fact Sheet: The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Approval of the Hague Convention
Regarding Intercountry Adoption, Immigration and Naturalization Service [herein "US Approval of
Hague Convention"], available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/adoption.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2005); Thompson, supra note 58, at 456.
63. Hague Convention, supranote 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1139, Ch.l, art ..
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intercountry adoption proceedings; 64 and (3) cooperation among sending and
process to legitimize the adoption in
receiving countries throughout the adoption
65
both the sending and receiving countries.
The Hague Convention divides the initial investigation of the child and the
66
The sending
prospective parents between the sending and receiving countries.
country is responsible for establishing that the child is an orphan without existing
parental ties, 67 while the receiving country must conduct home studies to determine
68
the fitness of the prospective family to raise and care for the child. Both of these
processes are imperative to concluding that the adoption is in the best interests of
the child. In order to make such a determination, the sending country must
establish: (1) that the child is adoptable; (2) the adoption is in the child's best
interests; and (3) consent from necessary parties, such as persons, institutions, and
authorities that have been "duly informed of the effects of their consent," and have
given their consent freely. 69 A child may not be adopted unless he or she is legally
orphaned; 70 defined as one whose two living natural parents are incapable of
properly caring for the child and whose parents freely give written irrevocable
consent to terminate their legal relationship with the child, allowing the child to be
adopted and emigrate.71
The receiving state must ensure that: (1) the prospective adoptive parents are
both "eligible and suited to adopt"; (2) the prospective parents have been
counseled on intercountry adoption and the process; and (3) the child is authorized
to enter and permanently reside in the receiving state.72 These investigatory
parents coming forward in the future
procedures eliminate the possibility of birth
73
to declare that the child is not an orphan.
To ensure that the proper investigations and duties are performed, the Hague
Convention requires countries to establish a central authority to oversee all steps
of the intercountry adoption process.74 To effectuate the purpose behind the Hague
Convention, the central authorities set requirements for accreditation of non-profit
adoption agencies,75 as well as staffing requirements to ensure that adoptive
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1139-1136, Ch. I, artil, Ch. IIl.
Id. at 1139, Ch.l, art. 1.
Id. at 1139-40, Ch. 11,art.4-5.
Id., Ch. II, art.4.
Id. at 1140, Ch. [1, art.5.
Id. at 1140, Ch.ll, art.4(l)-(3).

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS §3:15 (2004) [herein
IMMIGRATION LAW & BUS.].

71. Id.;

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK

[hereinafter

IMMIGRATION LEG. HANDBOOK] §4:34 (2004).

72. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Chll, art.5.
73. Id. at 1142, Ch. V, art.26.
74. Id. at 1140, Ch.Ill, art.6-10; see also Madelyn Freundlich, Transracial & Transcultural
Adoptions: A Look at the Ethical Issues, 27 FAM. ADVOC. 40, 43 (2004);Thompson, supra note 58, at
458.
75. Hague Convention, supranote 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Ch.IlI, art.10-12. The Hague Convention
requires the accreditation of adoption agencies who wish to handle intercountry adoptions. Id. To
become an accredited non-profit agency (as the Hague Convention only regulates non-profit agencies),
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76
agencies are operated efficiently by trained, experienced, and qualified staff.
Other important functions relegated to the central authorities are maintaining
information on all children entering and leaving the authority's borders through
intercountry adoption, establishing the suitability and eligibility of the prospective
adoptive parents, and granting authorization for the child to enter and permanently
reside in the receiving state. 7' By supervising each step of the intercountry
adoption process, central authorities are kept well-informed, preventing any
potential financial gain by disallowing corrupt adoption practices to slip past
authorities.78

To ensure that the adoptions are legally recognized both in the sending and
receiving countries, the Hague Convention sets forth requirements for the sending
and receiving countries to actively communicate and cooperate with one another
throughout the process. 79 This partly involves the exchange of necessary
information such as statistics, standard forms, and laws.8° In addition, central
authorities must issue adoption or custody certificates for all adoptions of children
residing in Hague countries, providing conclusive evidence of the relationship
between the adopted child and the adoptive parents. 81 The Hague Convention
enumerated this requirement due to past problems with recognizing intercountry
adoptions once the child emigrated to his or her new home and country.82 By law,
adoptions certified by the authority of the country of origin must be legally
recognized in other receiving countries. 83 "Recognition" includes acknowledgment
of the legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the adoptive child, the
parental responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child, and the termination of
84
the pre-existing legal relationship between the child and his or her mother.
By setting forth these regulations that require member states' compliance, the
Hague Convention hopes to ensure, first and foremost, that all intercountry
adoptions are in the best interests of the child. In general, widespread ratification
or accession to the Hague Convention could unify intercountry adoption laws. The
Hague Convention needs the support of the majority of sending and receiving
countries to work together to end child trafficking and corrupt adoption practices.
The efficiency of the intercountry adoption process and the unification of
intercountry adoption laws stand to strengthen the reputation of the practice.
Though it is important to point out the positive effects of the Hague Convention, it
is equally imperative to review the pitfalls of the international treaty.

agencies must meet ethical standards, training standards for its employees, and be subject to
supervision by authorities of the State. Id.
76. Id. at 1140, Ch.lli, art.l l(b).
77. Id. at 1140, Ch.lll, art.6-18; Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43; Thompson, supra note 58, at
458.
78. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Ch.lll, art.8.
79. Id. at 1141, Ch.Ill, art.7, 20.
80. Id. at 1140, Ch.Ill, art.7.
81. Id. at 1141, Ch.lll, art.15-16; IMMIGRATION LEG. HANDBOOK, supra note 71.
82. Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 130-32.
83. Hague Convention, supra note 13, 32 I.L.M at 1142, Ch.I1l, art.23.
84. Id. at 1142, Ch.Ill, art.26 (1)(C).
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C. The Hague Convention Fails to Address Important Issues Regarding
Compliance
Despite establishing safeguards and uniformity, the Hague Convention fails to
address several issues that are crucial to its ultimate implementation. These issues
perpetuate inequalities in sending and receiving countries' compliance with the
Hague Convention. For example, one would assume that the Hague Convention
would specifically prohibit intercountry adoptions with non-members, but this is
stated nowhere in the text of the treaty. Such a requirement would provide an
incentive and motivation for both sending and receiving countries to comply with
Hague Convention regulations. In addition, the signers of the Hague Convention
are not required to take any actions towards ratifying or acceding to the treaty,
imposing no obligations upon non-members. Countries that do choose to ratify or
accede to the treaty must incorporate the Hague Convention terms into their
domestic and international laws, which is no small feat.85 Although a sending or
receiving country may support the goals of the Hague Convention, the economic
and other costs of compliance may be overly burdensome, potentially causing nonparties to put off compliance with the Hague Convention to a point in the future, if
ever, thereby losing any incentive to become a party now.
Another interesting piece missing from the Hague Convention is a section
regarding penalties for non-compliance with the regulations-this job is reserved
for each member state to determine through its own legislation and its central
authority. 86 The problem with leaving punishment, such as sanctions or fines, up
to the individual countries is that self-regulation could encourage corrupt adoption
practices that will go unpunished without a non-partisan governmental
organization monitoring compliance and administering enforcement.
By failing to create an immediate incentive for countries to take measures to
become parties to the Hague Convention, the treaty allows for sending countries to
hold off on compliance-common sense indicates that receiving countries are
more likely to be punished by non-compliance than sending countries. Currently
the United States is one of the countries that has signed, but not yet ratified the
87
Hague Convention, and is not expected to ratify it until late 2006 or early 2007.
One potential repercussion of U.S. failure to ratify the Hague Convention is that
some member countries may limit their intercountry adoptions to other member
resulting in a suspension of adoptions with the United States
countries, possibly 88
ratification.
its
until
Interestingly, more frequently the sending countries will restrict working with
non-parties and seldom do receiving countries enforce such a restriction, unless the

85. In order for countries to be members of the Hague Convention, they must integrate the Hague
Convention requirements into their domestic laws. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32
I.L.M. at 1139-40, Ch.I, Ch. II..
86. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1139-41, Ch. II.
87. Hendy, supra note 56; IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13; Freundlich, supra
note 74.
88. Freundlich, supra note 74, at 42.
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sending country is well-known for child-trafficking. 9 Sending countries that have
historically prevented Americans from adopting their children, such as Bolivia,
Brazil, and Slovakia, would open their orphanages to Americans, if the United
States complied with the Hague Convention regulations.9" Receiving countries
actively seek intercountry adoption due to low birth rates and are therefore less
likely to place restrictions on the countries from where they may receive children
based on the desire to adopt and create families.
The Hague Convention created inequality among the receiving countries and
sending countries, making it more likely that receiving countries will comply with
the treaty in order to broaden the possibilities of places to receive children. At the
same time, sending countries have the liberty to be particular about the countries
that may adopt their children, and it is unlikely that receiving Hague countries will
cease to engage in intercountry adoptions with non-Hague countries. The cost and
organization required to conform with the Hague Convention pose two reasons
why some countries continue to avoid the Hague Convention 9' or have trouble
complying.
III.

THE UNITED STATES ENACTS THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF

2000

The United States is regarded as a wealthy receiving country, yet it is not one
of the sixty-four countries that has ratified the Hague Convention. Supporting the
Hague Convention's purpose and goals is one thing--complying with the
regulations to ratify the treaty is an entirely different matter. Taking the first steps
towards compliance, the United States passed the IAA in 2000,92 which is only the
first step to fully implement the Hague Convention. The delay in the U.S.
ratification of the Hague Convention in part stems from the long process of
reviewing the public comments regarding the proposed legislation, 93 and the
opposition voiced by many adoption agencies.
A. U.S. IntercountryAdoption Laws Priorto the ]AA
Strongly supporting the intentions and goals of the Hague Convention, the
United States, like other supporting countries, has worked to comply with the
regulations in order to become a party to the treaty. As one of the largest receiving
countries, the United States would benefit from becoming a party to the Hague
Convention through newfound access to adopt from countries that previously have
refused the United States as a recipient of children.94

89. See Echegaray, supra note 2.
90. Jeff D. Opdyke, Changes in Global Rules Toughen Process,WALL STREET J., Oct. 14, 2003

availableat http://www.lgrl.org/news/article.php?newslD=578 (last visited March 21, 2005).
91. Id.
92. See SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY,
§ 13:35, Hague Convention On Intercountry Adoption (2005).
93. The Department of State publishes the rules and reviews public comments submitted during
the public comment period. They may choose to incorporate the suggestions and modifications from
the public comments into the regulations but are not required to do so. The review period typically is
open for 90 days unless the Department chooses to extend the time period. See generally I Admin. L.
& Prac. § 4.32 (2d ed. 2005); Hendy, supra note 56.
94. Opdyke, supra note 90.
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The United States signed the Hague Convention on March 31, 1994,
demonstrating its intent to ratify the Hague Convention. 95 Congress passed the
IAA in September of 2000, establishing intercountry adoption regulations to
er20,teUS
comport with the Hague Convention. 96te Since September 2004, the U.S.
Department of State has been reviewing public comments to the proposed
regulations.97 By revamping the U.S. intercountry adoption policies, the IAA
benefits the United States, as well as starting the process of compliance with the
Hague Convention regulations.
Prior to the IAA, some called U.S. intercountry adoption policies and
procedures inefficient thanks to the repetitive nature of the process.98 Adoptive
parents not only had to comply with the country of origin's laws, where they might
only gain guardianship of the child, but also were required to go through the U.S.
judicial systems to fully adopt the child.99 Often times, parents of adoptive
children had to re-adopt the child in the U.S. after adopting the child in the country
of origin because two-thirds of the U.S. courts failed to recognize the validity of
the adoption in the country of origin. 100 Another redundancy that occurred during
the pre-IAA intercountry adoption process came from complying with the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) requirements to obtain an orphan's
visa. This process often duplicated the check that the country of origin performed
to ensure that the child was an orphan and that the adoption was in the best
interests of the child through home studies of the prospective parents. 10 1 In
addition, each state has adoption laws and procedures that must be complied with
in order to finalize an adoption.10 2 These administrative glitches and problems
served as deterrents to potential adoptive parents who otherwise would adopt
internationally, if not for the redundant process and red tape.
B. The IntercountryAdoption Act of 2000
The purpose of the IAA is three-fold:
(1) to implement the Hague Convention in the United States;
(2) to protect the rights and prevent the abuses against children, birth families,
and adoptive parents involved in adoptions subject to the Hague Convention,
ensuring the adoptions are in the children's best interests; and
seeking to
(3) to improve the federal government's ability to assist U.S.10families
3
adopt children from countries party to the Hague convention.
The IAA outlines the responsibilities of various federal agencies in regard to

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100
101.
102.
103.
at 494.

Thompson, supra note 58, at 457.
Anna Mary Coburn, et al., InternationalFamily Law, 38 INT'L LAW 493,493 (2004).
IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13.
Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131. See eg., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§19-5-200 to -216 (2005).
Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 131.
IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, §2(b); Cobum, supra note 96,
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intercountry adoption."° In accordance with the Hague Convention's requirement
that each country designate a central authority to be responsible for intercountry
adoption, the Department of State and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of
Children's Issues was designated as the central authority. 10 5 Along with the
Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services and the INS
worked to draft federal implementing legislation to conform with the Hague
Convention regulations. 0 6 As the central authority, the Department of State is
responsible for monitoring the adoption procedures in each adoption case and for
all incoming and outgoing adoptions, as well as
creating a case registry to record
10 7
an annual report to Congress.
A substantial portion of the IAA establishes an accreditation system for
adoption agencies and provides for the monitoring of accredited agencies to ensure
that the agencies comply with the IAA and the Hague Convention. One of the
most controversial sections of the IAA is Public Law Section 203(B)-G), which
requires agencies to: (1) hire a sufficient number of trained, qualified personnel;
(2) possess sufficient financial resources, organizational structure and procedures;
(3) hire social services professionals to capably provide adoption services; and (4)
have liability insurance.' 8 Agencies and approved individuals who fail to comply
with either the IAA or the Hague Convention are subject to enforcement actions
9
such as sanctions and suspension or cancellation of accreditation. 1
The IAA also adds a new Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(G) for
international adoptions. 1° The new definition of child requires adoptive parents to
be U.S. citizens and at least twenty five years of age in order to adopt a child under
the age of sixteen at the time the immigrant petition is filed. 1 ' Similar to the
language in the Hague Convention, Public Law Section 103(b) requires that the
Attorney General be satisfied with the investigatory process before she can
parents are fit to care for the child and that the child
conclude that the prospective
112
is indeed an orphan.
On September 15, 2003, the Department of State published a proposed rule in
the Federal Register, addressing the accreditation of adoption agencies and
113
approval of persons providing adoption services in Hague Convention cases.
104. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.l, §§101-103.
105. Id. at §101; U.S. Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62. See also Thompson, supra
note 58, at 458; Peter H. Pfund, Introductory Note to the U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, 41
I.L.M. 222, 222 (2002).
106. Pfund, supra note 105, at 222.
107. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.1,§§102(e), 104.
108. Id. at §203(b)(1)(B)-(G).
109. Id. at §202(3).
110. Id. at §302(a)(3); U.S. Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62; IGNATIUS & STICKNEY,
supranote 92.
111. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L.106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.3, §302(a)(3); U.S.
Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62; IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supranote 92.
112. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, §302(a)(i)-(IV); U.S.
Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62.
113. Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercontry Adoption Act of 2000; Accreditation
of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention Records, 68 Fed.Reg. 54064, 68
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Once a final list of accredited and approved adoption providers is completed, the
United States will be in a position to ratify the Hague Convention.! 14 The
Department of State has been preoccupied with reviewing public comments, many
of which voice an opposition to the legislation based on the imposing liability costs
and administrative costs of compliance for the adoption agencies.
C. Serious Concerns Over Financial, Licensing, and Administrative
Operations Issues Have Delayed Adoption of Regulations and Ratification of the
Hague Convention
Despite the time and energy put forth to draft and pass legislation reforming
intercountry adoption regulations, the United States still has a ways to go before it
can ratify the Hague Convention. One of the current controversies that keeps the
United States from ratifying the Hague Convention is the varied reactions of
adoption agency services in regard to the requirements of the IAA. 5 Some
adoption agencies are concerned that the costs of international adoptions will
increase with the regulations. 1 6 Typically, international adoption fees cost
anywhere between $15,000 - $25,000."17 The regulations may cause smaller
agencies to go out of business because compliance will impose greater liability
upon the agencies, as well as increased fees. 118 Weeding out the small adoption
agencies might make it impossible for anyone but the larger agencies with the
strongest financial profile and largest liability insurance policies to succeed in the
adoption business.
Many adoption agencies, large and small, 119 have voiced concerns that
compliance with the stringent regulations requires large extensions of insurance
coverage and carrying three months operating expenses as a financial base,
potentially putting many of them out of business. 120 The IAA, as written, makes
the U.S. agencies responsible for the actions of their employees working abroad,

Fed.Reg. 54119 (proposed Sept. 15, 2005), (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 96, 22 C.F.R. pt. 98),
available at http://www.gpoaccessgov/fr/index.html (last visited March 21, 2005); Public Comments
Update, at www.travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation/implementation_470.htm (last visited
March 21, 2005); Coburn, supra note 96, at 494.
114. Coburn, supra note 96, at 494.
115. Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43.
116. Simmons, supra note 24.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Spence Chapin may be considered a large agency, as it handles between 140-170 international
adoptions a year, while an agency like Angel's Haven Outreach only handles a total of 40-50 adoptions
in a year. See Spence Chapin Services to Families and Children, Comments on Proposed Regulations
Issued by the Department of State Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and the Intercountry
Adoption Act of 2000, Accreditation of Agencies, Approval of Persons, Preservation of Convention
Records
[herein
"Spence
Chapin"],
Dec.
15,
2003,
at
1,
available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005); Angel's
Haven
Outreach,
Public
Comment,
Dec.
15,
2003,
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_ 519.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
120. See AAA Partners in Adoption, Inc. [herein "AAA Partners"], Public Comment, Nov. 6, 2003,
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2005).
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whether they committed errors as innocuous, as clerical errors, or serious problems
such as medical misdiagnoses or inaccurate documentation. 21 The New Jerseybased agency, Reaching Out Thru International Adoption, submitted a public
comment to the Department of State, declaring, "American agencies cannot
reasonably be expected to visit every orphanage, attend every' 22doctor's visit, file
every paper for every child eligible for international adoption.",
Despite their support for the goals and purpose behind the Hague Convention
and the IAA, Spence-Chapin Services to Families and Children (Spence-Chapin), a
private, non-profit adoption agency that handles between 140-170 international
adoptions a year, expressed opposition to the proposed regulations that hold
primary provider agencies responsible for actions of entities abroad. 23 SpenceChapin argued that, as written, the regulations would impose "an unmanageable
financial burden on the agencies," to the point that they are "unworkable and
Spence-Chapin voiced that compliance with day-to-day
unrealistic."'' 24
supervision of American adoption agencies' international counterparts would be
would be impossible, putting many
extremely costly, and therefore compliance
25
adoption agencies out of business.
The price of liability insurance would spike to prohibitive levels due to the
new liability placed on primary adoption services; furthermore, many insurance
companies are likely to refuse to insure the adoption agencies. 26 In addition, the
fail to
proposed regulations "invite litigation," because the proposed regulations
27
cap damages, provide a quantum of proof, or statute of limitations.
Another common concern and complaint of organizations writing in public
comments to the Department of State, is the unrealistic nature and impracticality of
all staff members to have a Master's Degree in Social Work (herein a
requiring 128
"MSW").
Spence-Chapin commends the State Department for requiring that
staff members conducting home studies and other social services functions, be
required to have a master's degree in social work or related fields, as well as
significant clinical experience. 29 For other agencies, such as the Family Adoption
Consultants, which handles between 100-120 international adoption cases yearly,
the master's degree requirement for staff members would heavily increase their
operations costs and limit available staff. 130 In their opinion, a Bachelor's Degree
in social work or human services is more than sufficient. 1 3 ' This IAA requirement
121. Simmons, supra note 24.
122. Id.
123. Spence Chapin, supra note 119, at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 7.
127. Id. at 7-8.
128. AAA Partners, supra note 120; Family Adoption Consultants, Public Comment, Dec. 1, 2003,
(last visited Jan. 16,
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.htm
2005).
129. Spence Chapin, supra note 119.
130. Family Adoption Consultants, supra note 128.
131. Id.
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would prevent qualified staff members with years of experience and degrees from
working 2 for adoption agencies solely because these staff members never received a
13

MSW.

The concerns voiced in the public comments demonstrate that the language of
the IAA poses major issues to adoption agencies. Liability insurance premiums
will likely reject coverage of many adoption agencies, based on the new IAA
requirement that agencies be liable for all actions of overseas employees, over
whom agencies have limited control. 33 In addition, the requirement that staff
members earn a MSW precludes many qualified employees from operating
adoption agencies. 34 As the public comments show, it will be extremely difficult
for adoption agencies to be accredited in accordance with the IAA, and in turn the
Hague Convention, if the language of the statute remains unchanged. Over a
decade after signing the Hague Convention, the United States is still attempting to
ratify the treaty. 135 The message that comes across from the United States' slow
movement towards ratification is that compliance with the Hague Convention takes
a great deal of time, effort, and money and that it creates many conflicts along the
way.
The problems that the United States faces in its efforts to ratify and
implement the Hague Convention plague sending countries on an even larger scale.
Major sending countries allow their children to be raised with adoptive families
overseas due to the sending countries' inabilities to care for them. 36 In addition to
the financial burdens of compliance, cultural issues and national pride create
potential walls to the ratification and compliance of sending countries, which will
in turn, potentially undermine the goals of the Hague Convention.
IV.

RATIFICATION OF PRIMARY SENDING COUNTRIES
CULTURAL OPPOSITION AND ECONOMIC BURDENS

IS

THREATENED

BY

A. Social Stigmas and Conflicting Domestic Policies Make it Unlikely that
China and Korea will Ratify the Hague Convention
1. Domestic Policies Interfere with Compliance with the Hague Convention
Although China signed the Hague Convention in November 2000,137 the
country has yet to ratify it, or show signs that it will in the future.' 38 Chinese law

132. AAA Partners, supra note 120.
133. The IAA requires that each adoption agency have liability insurance. IAA, supra note 7, Pub.
L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit. 3, §203(b)(l)(E).
134. AAA Partners, supra note 120.
135. See Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43.
136. See eg. Singer, supra note 27, at 306.
137. Status Table of Contracting States to the Hague Convention, supra note 60.
138. Singer, supra note 27, at 304. Russia has yet to ratify the Hague Convention, though it seems
like ratification could occur in the future, based on a comment by Russian Federation Council Social
Policy Committee Chairman, Valentina Petrenko, who says that the Education Ministry will be the
Central Authority "after the document's ratification." U.S. Senators Moves to Protect Adopted
Children's Rights, INTERFAX NEws AGENCY (RUSSIA), April 16, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Interfax News Agency File.
Some objections that Russians have against international
adoption is the belief that their children should be raised in the Russian culture. Penny Owen, From
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gives preference to friends and relatives of the biological parents adopting the
child.' 39 In 1992, China passed an adoption law stating that foreigners may adopt
Chinese children, thereby abandoning its old requirement that the adoptive parents
be of Chinese descent or have close ties to China. 140 The Republic of China agreed
to treat foreigners, regardless of heritage, the same as nationals. 14 1 Though China
established the China Adoption Organization to regulate adoption in order to stop
child trafficking, 142 China has yet to take steps necessary to ratify the Hague
Convention.
Part of the problem is that China would need to change its domestic family
laws. China's current law conflicts with the Hague Convention, as Chinese law
states, "an adoption shall not contravene laws and regulations on family planning
laws and regulations.' 43 Chinese parents who give up a child for adoption may
not have another child without violating the family planning regulations.' 44 The
one-child policy encourages Chinese families to abandon their female babies until
a male is born, conflicting with the Hague Convention's goal of taking all
145
appropriate measures to allow the child to remain in his or her family of origin.
In light of the China's difficulty in changing its domestic laws to comply with the
international regulations, it becomes clear that ratification of the Hague
Convention would be no small feat for China.
2. Underlying Beliefs that Adoption is Disgraceful Make Sending Countries
Wary of Further Encouraging Incountry Adoption
In Asian regions, particularly Korea, bloodlines are extremely important
because they establish one's character. 46 Despite this pride, Korea has a
reputation for being a major baby exporter, sending thousands of its children to be
adopted overseas. 147 Part of Korean opposition to sending Korean children
overseas to be adopted by non-Korean families is the belief that adoption will strip

Russia with Love: American Families Embrace Russian Orphans, THE SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 2,

1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Sunday Oklahoman File.
139. Singer, supra note 27, at 304.
140. Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China, April I, 1992, Ch.Il, art.2 (1992); see also
Crystal J. Gates, China 's Newly Enacted IntercountryAdoption Law: Friend or Foe, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 369, 386 (1999).
141. Gates, supra note 119, at 386 (citing Order of the President of the People's Republic of China
No. 54, Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China [herein "Adoption Law of the People's
Republic of China"], availableat http://www.fwcc.org/china-adoption-law_98.htm (last visited Jan. 1,
2005)).
142. Id. at 387-88. The China Adoption Organization supervises the intercountry adoption process
and coordinates adoption by foreigners. Id. at 387. The China Adoption Organization looks at the
applications and investigates the qualifications of each set of prospective parents. Id. If the China
Adoption Organization approves the adoption, then it will proceed to find a prospective child to be
adopted. Id. at 388.
143. Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 141, Ch. 1, art.3.
144. Singer, supra note 27, at 307.
145. Id. at 308-09; Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1139, Ch. 11.
146. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 31, at 7.
147. Hyun-sung, supra note 36; Rethinking Adoption, KOREAN HERALD, Aug. 9, 2004, availableat
2004 WL 55442567.
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the child of his or her lineage and heritage, on which Korean culture prides
149
itself. 148 Culturally, Koreans see adoption as "disgraceful [and] shameful.
Korea's reputation as a baby exporter has fueled the societal belief that adoption
disgraces the country. 150 For example, one story that made headlines in the run-up
to the 1988 Seoul Olympics was, "Babies for Sale: South Korea makes them,
America buys them."' 151 In response to the worldwide publicity attracted by this
moratorium on the number
judgmental headline, the Korean government placed a 52
of Korean children available for intercountry adoption.1
When Korea's economy was growing in the 1990s, 153 the Korean government
contemplated ending intercountry adoption altogether by 2015,154 feeling that the
nation should move toward full dependency on domestic adoption. 55 To
encourage domestic adoptions, the government offered benefits in the form of
housing loans, tax exemptions, and school fee exemptions to Korean families
willing to adopt Korean children. 156 However, a slow down in Korea's economic
growth, forced the government to increase the number of overseas adoptions again
in 1998, at least temporarily delaying progress toward ending intercountry
adoption, 157 because Korea was not prospering at the rate it had hoped. 158 Thus,
to decrease the number of
nationalism and economics provoked the movement
159
children available for international adoption.
The national pride fueling the Korean government's desire to take care of its
children backfired, as few Koreans wanted to adopt children who were not of their
own family bloodlines. 160 Cultural beliefs prevent Korean families from wanting
to raise children outside of their blood lines.' 6 1 Of the 7,000 children who are
orphaned and abandoned in Korea each year, Koreans only adopt 1,600-1,700.162
Korean adoption laws are extremely particular in regard to who may be
certified as an adoptive parent. Foreign families are granted permission to
internationally adopt Korean children, only as a last resort once the government
163
has exhausted all methods to find willing Korean families to adopt the children.
148. SIMON & ALSTEIN, supra note 31, at 7.
149. Hyun-sung, supra note 36.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. SIMON & ALSTEIN, supra note 31, at 8.
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Though international adoption is allowed, the Korean government restricts eligible
prospective parents to married, heterosexual couples in good health and of solid
moral character and economic stability, with the stipulation that the parents
provide the child with an education, as well as freedom of religion.1 64
Based on national pride, cultural beliefs, and domestic policies, China and
Korea are unlikely to ratify the Hague Convention in the foreseeable future,
despite their consistent use of the intercountry adoption system to care for their
orphaned children. Although China and Korea both allow for intercountry
adoption, they both have expressed an inclination for having children domestically
adopted, preferably by relatives, or if relatives are not an option, friends of the
child's parents.
B. The Burden of Complying with the Hague Convention Establishes Another
Reasonfor Sending Countries to Refuse Ratification
The problems that the Hague Convention poses to sending countries are the
same as those posed to receiving countries, though the means of compliance
present a far greater burden on sending countries. 165 The United States is
unquestionably one of the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world and
one of the largest receivers of internationally adopted children,166 yet the United
States has pushed off ratification of the Hague Convention year to year, currently
estimating full compliance and ratification sometime in 2006 or 2007.167
Compliance takes a great deal of time and money; for poorer countries facing
political turmoil and economic down turn, compliance poses an even bigger
problem. The Hague Convention delegates an enormous responsibility upon the
sending countries to investigate the legality of the child who168is orphaned and to
determine whether the adoption is in the child's best interests.
As history shows, intercountry adoption is at its peak when world disasters,
wars, and other economic or political changes occur because richer and more
stable countries have families who want to try to rescue children from the plight of
poverty and instability.' 69 These disasters and situations of turmoil make it
extremely difficult for affected countries to support their children, thus forcing
them to allow their children to be internationally adopted. China's orphanages in
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the 1990s were so heavily inundated with female infants that the staff and
resources could not care for the large number of children, resulting in high
mortality rates. 170 As recorded in 1999, the United States adopted between 80 and
90 percent of Chinese orphans.' 71
Although the Chinese and Korean economies are growing, and available
statistics demonstrate that only four to five percent of the people in each country
live in poverty, 112 neither country perceives itself to be economically stable enough
to place a moratorium on, or formally end, intercountry adoption. 173 Whether the
countries are truly in economic need or whether they are simply not willing to
allocate the resources to care for their orphans and unwanted children is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Despite its equal intentions, the Hague Convention favors compliance by
receiving countries with the laws, citizens, and resources that generally support
intercountry adoption and facilitate compliance. In the United States, the
Department of State has been preoccupied in part by the reviewing of public
comments to the IAA, the American attempt to implement the requirements of the
Hague Convention. In comparison, sending countries such as China and Korea
culturally oppose dependence on intercountry adoption to raise their children but
engage in the practice out of necessity. In light of the stigma these countries attach
to intercountry adoption, it seems logical to assume that if countries like China and
Korea had the resources, they would sooner take the money to devote to the care of
their orphans, ending the shameful practice, than to use the money to implement
and ratify the Hague Convention, which promotes intercountry adoption. By
failing to recognize the heightened economic burden of compliance and the
cultural opposition to intercountry adoption, the Hague Convention creates
disincentives for major sending countries to be come parties to the Hague
Convention, which potentially undermine the goals of the treaty.
CONCLUSION

The Hague Convention was drafted in such a manner that it encourages
cooperation among countries to unify adoption procedures and regulations; the
Convention's good intentions, however, leave room for problems that could
undermine realistic achievement of the treaty's goals. Nowhere in the treaty does
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it restrict parties from entering intercountry adoptions with non-parties, providing
no push for countries to ratify or accede to it. For the Hague Convention to
operate and function as it was intended requires the ratification and cooperation of
both sending and receiving countries. The Hague Convention is blind to the fact
that the burdens of compliance on sending countries exceeded those of receiving
countries, both in the priority to draft and implement regulations, as well as the
economic stability to fund compliance.
Despite the goals and purpose behind the Hague Convention, it is highly
unlikely that intercountry adoptions between parties and non-parties will come to
an end, though receiving countries will have spent the time and money on
complying with the Hague Convention and major sending countries will not have.
The message this sends is that compliance and becoming a party to the Hague
Convention do not affect the sending countries' ability to participate in
intercountry adoption, making it questionable as to why they should spend their
resources and time on the compliance. After all, the old saying goes, "why buy the
cow when you can get the milk for free?" If sending countries are not penalized
for non-compliance with the Hague Convention, and the sending countries are
well-aware that they have a "hot commodity" that many people want no matter the
cost, then why would a sending country bother to spend the time and money to
implement the Hague Convention, despite its admirable purpose and goals. If the
sending countries possess the resources to implement solid regulation and
monitoring of intercountry adoptions, they are more likely to spend the money on
supporting their own orphans to save face and move away from intercountry
adoption based on social stigma and national disdain for the practice of
intercountry adoption.
The Hague Convention can accomplish great things with uniformity of
intercountry adoption laws, but as it stands, there is no motivation for sending
countries like Korea and China to ratify or accede to it. Without the cooperation of
major sending and receiving countries, the Hague Convention will not meet its
objectives. The United States, despite slow-moving efforts to ratify the Hague
Convention, supports intercountry adoption and the objectives and principles
behind the Hague Convention. In contrast, sending countries like China and Korea
lack the national support to ratify the Hague Convention , because intercountry
adoption practices promote shameful dependency on foreign countries. Korea
would abolish intercountry adoption if the country's economy were strong enough
to support its children, hence why the Korean government set a goal to end
intercountry adoption by 2015. Based on similar Asian values, it would not be
surprising if China followed suit one day in the future. The cultural opposition and
the economic burden of compliance are the two major influences that will keep
sending countries like China and Korea from ratifying the Hague Convention.
While it seems like the support of over sixty countries is a sign that the Hague
Convention is and will succeed, the fact that the treaty is unsupported by three of
the major sending countries sends a message that creating a system of unification
of intercountry adoption laws was not enough. The Hague Convention should
have stressed the need for compliance of all sending and receiving countries,
limiting member states to intercountry adoptions through other member states;
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thereby creating incentives for major sending countries to ratify. As it stands,
compliance with the Hague Convention is in the best interest of receiving
countries, who will benefit from adoption access to countries who previously
prevented them from adopting. Sending countries, on the other hand, are given the
liberty to limit the receiving countries that may adopt their children, because they
know that receiving countries are desperate to adopt children, no matter the costs.
The Hague Convention cannot succeed when sending countries may still benefit
from intercountry adoption without complying with the Hague Convention.
Despite the appearance of moving forward in intercountry adoption laws, the lack
of cooperation by major sending countries keeps this forward movement from
being a possibility.
Even though the United States' delayed implementation of the Hague
Convention does not turn on fundamental cultural or moral values, the continuing
failure of the U.S. ratification potentially sends a message to the world that the
United States does not consider the Hague Convention a necessary means of
regulating international adoptions. If one of the largest and wealthiest receiving
countries is not compelled to move on this issue, then why should major sending
countries, such as China and Korea, feel any particular need to take on the
economic burdens that might be associated with implementing the Hague
Convention in the fact of societal and cultural objections?
The Tsunami disaster, impacting the lives of thousands of children left
orphaned, has brought a public spotlight on the potential role of international
adoptions as a form of humanitarian outreach to children with needs that go
beyond aid in the form of water, food, shelter, and material items. As of now, the
Hague Convention has yet to realize its commendable goals and given the
problems discussed in this paper, may never do so. From this point forward, there
needs to be a serious public debate over the best means to regulate international
adoptions to protect the best interests of children and also to achieve maximum
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cooperation among sending and receiving countries.
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families
to
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not
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actions
the
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suggests that
the spirit of the Hague Convention. Yet, until the major sending and receiving
countries ratify the treaty, there is no certainty as to what, if any, impact the Hague
Convention might have on future international adoption issues. The real question
that needs resolution is whether the international community truly needs a
controlling international treaty such as the Hague Convention to assure that the
best interests of intercountry adoptees are protected as the first priority. If so, then
proponents must undertake a concerted effort to persuade all countries, including
the United States, that ratification is a matter of urgency, or to come together to
explore an agreement that would be acceptable to the major sending and receiving
countries participating in international adoptions.

